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Abstract 26 
The age-related positivity effect—a preference for processing positive stimuli over 27 
negative stimuli—is posited by socioemotional selectivity theory to reflect a focus on emo-28 
tional gratification in older age. Yet, the positivity effect has been investigated with stimuli, 29 
such as photographs of faces and visual scenes, that have little (to no) association with real-30 
life consequences. Decisions that involve risk require evaluating valenced information that is 31 
associated with positive and negative possible outcomes. Older adults take fewer risks than 32 
younger adults when their decisions have possible negative consequences. The current re-33 
search investigated whether the age-related positivity effect extends to cognitive processing 34 
of valenced information that is association with real-life consequences. In Experiment 1, par-35 
ticipants generated possible outcomes of engaging in risky activities. In Experiment 2, partic-36 
ipants identified as quickly as possible whether putative outcomes were relevant to risky ac-37 
tivities. Diffusion model analysis was used to model the cognitive processes underlying age-38 
related differences in processing of valenced information. In contrast with the age-related 39 
positivity effect, in Experiment 1, younger adults showed an initial focus on retrieving posi-40 
tive outcomes, which shifted to an initial focus on negative outcomes in older age. In Experi-41 
ment 2, younger adults were faster and more accurate to identify positive than negative out-42 
comes of risky activities—a tendency that dissipated in older age. In conclusion, the age-re-43 
lated positivity effect may not extend to cognitive processing of valenced information that is 44 
associated with real-life consequences. It is speculated that while older adults may often pri-45 
oritize emotional gratification, they possess a repertoire of goals and switch between goals 46 
according to the nature of their task. 47 
 48 
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Across adulthood, a multitude of changes occur (e.g., cognitive, physical, situa-51 
tional), and with these changes comes re-orientation in people’s goals and priorities. One 52 
such developmental change that has received considerable attention is the positivity effect, 53 
which describes an age-related increase in preference for processing positive stimuli over 54 
negative stimuli and is proposed to result from goal re-orientation across adulthood (Charles 55 
& Carstensen, 2010; Reed & Carstensen, 2012). The positivity effect has been exhibited in a 56 
variety of tasks, including cognitive tasks involving visual attention (e.g., Mather & Carsten-57 
sen, 2003; Steinmetz, Muscatell, & Kensinger, 2010) and memory (e.g., Charles, Mather, & 58 
Carstensen, 2003; Kennedy, Mather, & Carstensen, 2004). Yet, previous studies exploring 59 
age-related differences in cognitive processing of positive and negative information have fo-60 
cussed on stimuli, such as faces and features of hypothetical choice options, that have limited 61 
(to no) association with real-life consequences. Conversely, in their daily lives, people rou-62 
tinely make decisions (e.g., whether to walk home alone at night) that elicit evaluations of 63 
positive and negative information associated with positive (e.g., arrive home sooner) and neg-64 
ative (e.g., be attacked) consequences. A better understanding of the conditions under which 65 
the positivity effect occurs or does not occur is necessary to enrich our understanding of how 66 
adult developmental changes in goal orientation influence cognitive processing of valenced 67 
information. To this end, the current research investigates whether the age-related positivity 68 
effect extends to cognitive processing of stimuli that are associated with real-life conse-69 
quences. 70 
A wealth of research has documented an age-related positivity effect in cognitive 71 
processing of positive and negative stimuli (Reed, Chan, & Mikels, 2014). In a prototypical 72 
task, a photo of an emotional face is briefly displayed side-by-side with a neutral face before 73 
the appearance of a dot that appears randomly in one of the two face locations. Mather and 74 
Carstensen (2003) found that when the dot appeared in the location of the emotional face 75 
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older adults (62–94 years) were faster to respond if it was a positive face and were slower to 76 
respond if it was a negative face in comparison with the neutral face. Conversely, younger 77 
adults (18–35 years) showed no attentional bias to the positive or negative faces (see also 78 
Charles et al., 2003). Thus, older adults demonstrated an age-related preference for emotion-79 
ally gratifying stimuli (i.e., positive faces) and a bias against negative emotional stimuli (i.e., 80 
negative faces). Incorporating eye-tracking, Isaacowitz, Wadlinger, Goren, and Wilson 81 
(2006a) found that older adults (61–85 years) directed their gaze toward happy (i.e., positive) 82 
faces in the dot-probe task and away from sad (i.e., negative) faces when emotional faces 83 
were paired with neutral faces. Conversely, younger adults (18–24 years) showed an atten-84 
tional bias against negative faces, but no attentional preference in their gaze toward positive 85 
faces (see also Isaacowitz et al., 2006b; Nikitin & Freund, 2011). The age-related positivity 86 
effect in attention allocation has also been supported by meta-analyses (Murphy & Isaa-87 
cowitz, 2008; Reed, Chan, & Mikels, 2014).  88 
Age-related differences in cognitive processing of positive and negative information 89 
extend to non-facial stimuli. Mather, Knight, and McCaffrey (2005) found that older adults 90 
spent more of their viewing time than younger adults inspecting positive features (e.g., gas 91 
mileage) of choice options (e.g., models of car) and less time inspecting negative features. In 92 
another study, participants could review attributes of hypothetical healthcare plans by open-93 
ing corresponding boxes on a computer monitor with a mouse cursor (Löckenhoff & Carsten-94 
sen, 2007; see also Löckenhoff & Carstensen, 2008). The boxes were color-coded to identify 95 
whether they contained information about a positive, negative, or neutral feature of the 96 
healthcare plans. In comparison with younger adults (22–39 years), older adults (62–93 years) 97 
preferentially inspected a greater proportion of positive compared to negative features. 98 
The positivity effect has also been reported in studies of long-term and autobio-99 
graphical memory (Charles et al., 2003; Kennedy et al., 2004). In one study (Charles et al., 100 
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2003), participants viewed a series of positive, negative, and neutral images (e.g., images of 101 
people, animals, nature scenes, inanimate objects) displayed on a computer screen. Later, par-102 
ticipants were asked to describe the images they saw. Older adults recalled more positive im-103 
ages than negative images, whereas younger adults recalled a similar number of positive and 104 
negative images. As well as spending more of their viewing time than younger adults inspect-105 
ing positive features of choice options and less time inspecting negative features, older adults 106 
also recall more positive features for their chosen options (Leigland, Schulz, & Janowsky, 107 
2004; Löckenhoff & Carstensen, 2007; Mather, Knight, & McCaffrey, 2005). Age-related 108 
differences in recall of positive and negative stimuli may result from a preferential focus of 109 
attention during stimulus encoding, such that older adults, in comparison with younger adults, 110 
focus their attention more toward positive stimuli and away from negative stimuli. Age-re-111 
lated differences may also emerge during recall as older adults may more frequently reject 112 
negative memories and more frequently endorse positive memories. 113 
Spaniol, Voss, and Grady (2008) had participants view positive, negative, and neu-114 
tral photographs during an incidental study phase. In a later recognition test phase, partici-115 
pants were asked to indicate whether test items were among those they had seen previously 116 
(i.e., were old or new). The authors used diffusion model analysis (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & 117 
Rouder, 1998)—a cognitive modeling approach for decomposing behavior on two-choice re-118 
action-time tasks—to examine the cognitive mechanisms underlying age-related differences 119 
in memory retrieval. An appealing aspect of diffusion model analysis is that it decomposes 120 
behavior into psychologically meaningful components. Within the diffusion model, drift rate, 121 
v, measures the rate of accumulation of evidence in favor of a response (i.e., ‘new’ or ‘old’), 122 
where higher values indicate faster and more accurate responding, indicating greater memory 123 
strength. Drift rate is distinguishable from other parameters, including boundary separation, 124 
a, which measures the threshold for responding, reflecting a speed-accuracy trade-off, and 125 
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nondecision time, Ter, which includes non-decisional components such as stimulus encoding 126 
and response execution. Accordingly, a higher drift rate for old versus new test items would 127 
indicate greater accessibility of pre-experimental memories, increasing speed and accuracy of 128 
recognition. Spaniol et al. (2008) discovered that older adults exhibited a higher drift rate for 129 
old versus new positive items than younger adults, suggesting that positive pre-experimental 130 
memories were more accessible to older adults. Moreover, this effect did not differ for faces, 131 
scenes, or words. The authors concluded that the age-related positivity effect for memory re-132 
trieval may result from greater accessibility of positive long-term memories among older 133 
adults. 134 
The age-related positivity effect has been conceptualized within socioemotional se-135 
lectivity theory (SST; Carstensen, 2006; Carstensen & Mikels, 2005; Charles & Carstensen, 136 
2010; Reed & Carstensen, 2012)—a motivational theory of lifespan development. According 137 
to SST, people possess a constellation of goals, including goals related to instrumental needs 138 
and emotional gratification, that shift in priority across adulthood according to one’s per-139 
ceived time horizon. A person who perceives their time horizon as expansive or open-ended, 140 
as in early adulthood, prioritizes future-oriented instrumental goals, which may include learn-141 
ing new skills or acquiring knowledge. As a person approaches later stages of life, time hori-142 
zons are perceived to shorten and priorities shift to present-focused goals, namely emotional 143 
gratification. 144 
An important tenet of SST is that cognitive processing is driven by motivations in a 145 
top-down fluid manner as opposed to a bottom-up fixed manner by which age alone would 146 
determine goal priorities. As such, a person’s goal priorities depend on their perceived time 147 
horizon rather than their age per se. Indeed, when older adults were asked to imagine that a 148 
new medical advance promises them an additional 20 years of life in good health, their social 149 
preferences shifted from indicating a preference to spend time with a familiar social partner 150 
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to preferring to spend time instead with a novel social partner, indicating a motivational shift 151 
away from emotional gratification with an expanded time horizon (Fung, Carstensen, & Lutz, 152 
1999; see also, Fredrickson & Carstensen, 1990). Conversely, when younger adults were 153 
asked to imagine that they would soon emigrate to another country, constraining their time 154 
horizon, their social preferences instead shifted toward a preference to spend time with a fa-155 
miliar social partner (Fung et al., 1999). 156 
However, previous studies reporting an age-related positivity effect have focused on 157 
materials, such as photographs of faces, scenes, and words, and features (e.g., gas mileage) of 158 
hypothetical choice options (e.g., models of car), that are not associated with real-life conse-159 
quences. Conversely, in real life, people routinely make decisions that involve risk with the 160 
possibility of positive outcomes that are beneficial or pleasurable and negative outcomes that 161 
are harmful or unpleasant. Taking a river rapid ride on a small boat, for example, may be 162 
thrilling and exhilarating, but could result in physical injury. Decisions about whether to en-163 
gage in such risky activities involve a trade-off between the expected beneficial outcomes of 164 
a decision option (e.g., taking a river rapid ride) and the risk of negative outcomes (Weber, 165 
Blais, & Betz, 2002). This trade-off requires consideration of the possible positive (e.g., thrill, 166 
exhilaration) and negative (e.g., physical injury) outcomes. Thus, people often evaluate posi-167 
tive and negative information that is associated with possible positive and negative conse-168 
quences of decision-making. 169 
Older adults take fewer risks than younger adults when their decisions involve possi-170 
ble negative outcomes (Rolison, Hanoch, & Wood, 2012; Rolison, Hanoch, Wood, & Pi-Ju, 171 
2014; Turner & McClure, 2003). In one task (Rolison, Wood, & Hanoch, 2017), participants 172 
were asked to indicate whether they would engage in activities (e.g., using an ATM machine 173 
in the street) before and after listening to audio extracts of media reports conveying infor-174 
mation about possible negative outcomes (e.g., a report on ATM fraud). Participants also 175 
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rated their emotional valence and arousal responses to the reports. Older adults were more re-176 
sponsive than younger adults to the negative information conveyed in the reports, indicating 177 
that they would forgo more activities in their subsequent decisions. These age differences in 178 
decision-making were attributable to stronger negative emotional responses experienced by 179 
older adults to the reports. Therefore, it is unclear whether older adults would exhibit the age-180 
related positivity effect when processing positive and negative information that is associated 181 
with positive and negative real-life consequences. In contrast to an age-related positivity ef-182 
fect, older adults may actually focus more than younger adults on information about possible 183 
negative outcomes and less on information about possible positive outcomes as this relates to 184 
their willingness to take a risk. 185 
No previous study has explored whether younger and older adults differ in their at-186 
tentional processing of valenced stimuli when it is associated with possible real-life conse-187 
quences. In Rolison et al. (2017), decision-making was assessed only in response to infor-188 
mation about negative possible outcomes. However, it may be the case that older adults are 189 
more responsive or allocate more attentional resources than younger adults to all valenced 190 
stimuli, regardless of whether it is positive or negative. Hence, previous research has not ex-191 
plored whether there exist age-related differences in attentional processing of valenced stim-192 
uli that is associated with real-life consequences. A better understanding of the limits and nu-193 
ances of the age-related positivity effect would help inform theoretical models, such as SST, 194 
about how adult developmental changes in goal orientation affect cognitive processing of va-195 
lenced information. Namely, if the positivity effect does not extend to stimuli that is associ-196 
ated with possible real-life consequences then this would suggest that emotional gratification 197 
goals are not prioritized in older adulthood for all types of valenced information, and specifi-198 
cally not when valenced information is associated with real-life consequences to which older 199 
adults are known to be less willing to take a risk than their younger counterparts. 200 
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In Experiment 1, younger and older adults were asked to list possible outcomes of 201 
engaging in real-life risky activities. If the age-related positivity effect extends to valenced 202 
information that is associated with real-life consequences, then compared to younger adults, 203 
older adults should focus their attention on generating positive rather than negative possible 204 
outcomes. This finding would be consistent with previous reports of older adults focussing 205 
their attention on positive memories and away from negative memories during retrieval of 206 
studied material (e.g., Löckenhoff & Carstensen, 2007; Mather et al., 2005). If instead, the 207 
positivity effect does not extend to this type of valenced information, then younger and older 208 
adults may generate similar outcomes in terms of their valence or older adults may exhibit a 209 
negativity effect by focussing on generating negative rather than positive outcomes in com-210 
parison with younger adults, consistent with their lower willingness to take risks that involve 211 
a possibility of negative consequences. 212 
In Experiment 2, participants were presented a sample of the positive and negative 213 
outcomes previously generated for risky activities by participants in Experiment 1 and irrele-214 
vant outcomes that had been generated for other activities. Participants’ task was to decide as 215 
quickly as possible whether each putative outcome is relevant to an activity. If the age-related 216 
positivity effect extends to valenced information that is associated with real-life conse-217 
quences (i.e., of engaging in risky activities) then older adults should be faster to respond to 218 
positive outcomes and slower to respond to negative outcomes in comparison with younger 219 
adults. This finding would be consistent with previous reports of an age-related shift in atten-220 
tional focus toward processing positive information and away from processing negative infor-221 
mation (e.g., Charles et al., 2003; Isaacowitz et al., 2006a; 2006b). However, as in the genera-222 
tion of possible outcomes (Experiment 1), the age-related positivity effect may reduce or re-223 
verse when participants are required to respond to positive and negative possible outcomes of 224 
engaging in risky activities, reflecting older adults’ lower willingness to take risks. 225 
 Adult age differences in evaluating outcomes of risky activities - 10 
 
10 
 
The two-choice reaction-time methodology employed in Experiment 2 further ena-226 
bles modeling of the cognitive processes underlying age-related differences in processing of 227 
valenced information. As discussed earlier, Spaniol et al. (2008) used diffusion model analy-228 
sis to decompose response times on a two-choice recognition memory task. The authors dis-229 
covered that an age-related positivity effect in recognition memory resulted from greater ac-230 
cessibility of positive long-term memories in older adults, as indicated by a higher drift rate 231 
in the diffusion model. In their study, a higher drift rate reflected faster and more accurate re-232 
sponding to old (i.e., previously studied) versus new items in a test phase. Here, in Experi-233 
ment 2, diffusion model analysis is employed to investigate cognitive processing of positive 234 
and negative outcomes of risky activities. Thus, differences in drift rate will indicate whether 235 
positive or negative possible outcomes are more readily brought to mind when imagining en-236 
gaging in risky activities.  237 
Experiment 1 238 
Method 239 
Participants 240 
Fifty younger adults (56% female; age range 18-35 years, M = 23.60, SD = 4.83) and 241 
50 older adults (54% male; age range 65-81 years, M = 69.00, SD = 4.15) were recruited from 242 
the university campus and local community. The sample size of 50 participants per age band 243 
is comparable with previous studies showing age-related differences in processing of positive 244 
and negative information (e.g., Mather & Carstensen, 2003). All older adults passed the mini 245 
mental state examination as a screen for cognitive impairment. Participants were compen-246 
sated £5 (~$7.04 US dollars) for their participation, which lasted around 45 minutes. The ma-247 
jority of younger adults were students (n = 39, 78%). The remaining were in part-time (n = 8, 248 
16%) or full-time (n = 3, 6%) employed. The majority of older adults were retired (n = 38, 249 
76%), with the remaining in part-time employment (n = 10, 20%). Ethical approval for the 250 
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study protocol was provided by the internal ethics review board (institution: University of Es-251 
sex; title: The consideration of consequences across adulthood; protocol number: JR1604) All 252 
participants provided written informed consent prior to participating in the study. 253 
Materials and procedure 254 
Generating outcomes. The 24 scale items (see Appendix A for full list) included ac-255 
tivities and behaviors in four life domains, including the recreational, health, financial, and 256 
social domains. The items were adapted from the Domain Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) 257 
scale. The DOSPERT scale has been used extensively to study adult age-related differences 258 
in self-reported risk-taking across life domains (Blais & Weber, 2006; Rolison, Hanoch, 259 
Freund, in press; Rolison et al., 2014). However, some items of the DOSPERT, such as ‘start-260 
ing a new career in your mid-thirties’ in the financial domain, were deemed less relevant to 261 
people in older age ranges and were replaced with activities that were less age specific, such 262 
as ‘using your credit card to pay for an item on an unfamiliar website’. Other activities im-263 
plied physical abilities that may be more limited in older age, such as abilities required for 264 
‘bungee jumping off a tall bridge’ in the recreational domain, and were replaced with items 265 
that required less physical strength or agility, such as ‘taking a ride through the countryside 266 
on the back of a high performance motorcycle’. 267 
As new items were developed for the present purposes, it was important to ensure 268 
that the scale items broadly represented their intended life domain. In two waves of pilot test-269 
ing, participants were asked to indicate for each item its most relevant life domain. In the first 270 
wave of pilot testing (n = 99; mean age = 39.24; SD = 15.10; 18-35 years, n = 55; 36-64 271 
years, n = 38, >65 years, n 
 
= 6), a mean of 15.48 of the 24 items were allocated to the in-272 
tended domain. Following further modifications to some scale items, in the second wave of 273 
pilot testing (n = 100, mean age = 37.61, SD = 13.62, n18-35 years = 54, n36-64 years = 43, n65+ years 274 
= 3), a mean of 18.67 of the 24 items were allocated to the intended domain. Thus, the scale 275 
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broadly reflects the intended life domains, indicating that it captures a broad range of risky 276 
activities and behaviors. 277 
A printed booklet was produced for each participant containing eight of the risky ac-278 
tivities, which consisted of two randomly selected items from each domain among the full list 279 
of 24 items. Eight items were deemed appropriate for the targeted participation time (i.e., < 1 280 
hour) and to limit effects of fatigue. 281 
On each page of the booklet, participants were asked to imagine engaging in an ac-282 
tivity (e.g., ‘betting on the outcome of a sporting event’) and to write down up to 20 things 283 
that might happen as a result of engaging in the activity. Loaded terms (e.g., consequence) 284 
were avoided throughout the participant instructions in favor of more neutral terms (e.g., out-285 
come). To the right of each generated outcome, participants indicated whether it was a good, 286 
bad, or neutral outcome by circling a corresponding label and ranked its importance (value of 287 
1 = most important) in determining whether they would engage in the activity.
 
288 
Risk-taking attitudes. After generating outcomes for activities, participants were pre-289 
sented all 24 risky activity items and rated their risk behavior, risk perceptions, and expected 290 
benefits for each item in each of three sections of a printed booklet. The items were displayed 291 
in a randomly generated order for each section but were presented in the same order for each 292 
participant. The risk behavior, risk perceptions, and expected benefits sections of the booklet 293 
were presented in a randomly generated order for each participant. In the risk behavior sec-294 
tion, participants rated on a 7-point scale, ranging -3 (‘Extremely unlikely’) to 3 (‘Extremely 295 
likely’), the likelihood they would engage in each activity if they were to find themselves in 296 
the depicted situation. In the risk perceptions section, participants were provided a definition 297 
of risk in lay terms and were asked to rate on a 7-point scale, ranging 0 (‘Not at all risky’) to 298 
6 (‘Extremely risky’), how risky they perceived that it would be for them to engage in each 299 
activity. In the expected benefits section, participants rated on a 7-point scale, ranging 0 (‘No 300 
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benefits at all’) to 6 (‘Great benefits’), the benefits they believed they would obtain from en-301 
gaging in each activity. The participant instructions and rating scales were similar to those 302 
used in the DOSPERT scale, developed by Blais and Weber (2006). 303 
Results 304 
Envisioning outcomes of engaging in risky activities 305 
Participants each generated a mean of 6.00 (SD = 1.82) outcomes per activity. Col-306 
lectively, they produced a large variety of possible outcomes, generating a mean of 69.75 (SD 307 
= 14.51) unique outcomes per activity.1 Consequently, few of the outcomes were generated 308 
by many participants, with each unique outcome being generated by a mean of 2.92 (SD = 309 
0.49) participants. 310 
Participants generated a mean of 2.57 (SD = 0.97) positive outcomes, 2.63 (SD = 311 
0.93) negative outcomes, and 0.80 (SD = 0.61) neutral outcomes per activity. To test for ef-312 
fects of age, a Poisson loglinear analysis was conducted on the number of outcomes gener-313 
ated for activities. Few neutral outcomes were generated and thus were omitted from the 314 
analysis. Age (younger, older) and type of outcome (positive, negative) were included as pre-315 
dictors. The standard errors of the model coefficients were adjusted using a generalized esti-316 
mating equation to account for repeated measures (i.e., activities) within participants. The 317 
analysis yielded no significant effect of age (odds ratio = 0.91, p = .109) or type of outcome 318 
(odds ratio = 1.04, p = .369) and no interaction. Regarding the importance rankings, partici-319 
pants ranked positive outcomes (M = 3.08, SD = 1.54) as more important for informing their 320 
decisions than negative outcomes (M = 3.78, SD = 2.01). To test for effects of age, a random 321 
effects linear regression analysis was conducted on the mean importance ranking for the posi-322 
tive and negative outcomes of activities. Random intercepts were included for participants 323 
                                                          
1
 Outcomes that differed in their wording, but conveyed the same meaning (e.g., “attacked by wild animals”, 
“animal threatens you”) were classified as a single outcome.  
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and fixed effects were included for age and type of outcome. The analysis confirmed a signif-324 
icant effect of type of outcome (b = 0.70, p < .001), but yielded no significant effect of age (b 325 
= -0.22, p = .192) or interaction. 326 
While the analysis above indicates that younger and older adults did not differ sig-327 
nificantly in the total number of positive and negative outcomes they generated for activities, 328 
they may have differed in their initial focus on positive or negative outcomes. If so, age-re-329 
lated differences may emerge in whether younger and older adults first generated a positive 330 
or a negative outcome for the activities. Regarding the first outcome generated, participants 331 
frequently produced a positive (48%) or negative (47%) outcome and rarely a neutral (5%) 332 
outcome. To test for effects of age on the first outcome produced, a mixed-effects logistic re-333 
gression analysis was conducted on the first outcome generated for activities when a positive 334 
or negative outcome was produced. Neutral outcomes were omitted as few were generated. 335 
Random intercepts were included for participants and a fixed effect was included for age 336 
(younger, older). The analysis revealed a significant effect of age on the likelihood that a pos-337 
itive (rather than a negative) outcome was the first outcome produced (odds ratio = 0.62, p = 338 
.024). Figure 1 shows the estimated probabilities and confirms a tendency for younger adults 339 
to first generate a positive outcome and for older adults to first generate a negative outcome. 340 
This finding is in stark contrast with a body of existing research indicating an age-related 341 
shift from preferential processing of negative information toward positive information in 342 
older age (e.g., Reed et al., 2014). 343 
Moreover, inspecting the importance rankings, participants ranked the first outcome 344 
they generated as more important (M = 2.42; SD = 0.88) than other outcomes (M = 3.99; SD 345 
= 1.03) in determining whether they would engage in the activities. A 2x2 mixed analysis of 346 
variance (ANOVA) was conducted on participants’ mean rankings averaged across activities 347 
and included age (younger, older) and outcome order (first outcome, remaining outcomes) as 348 
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factors. A significant effect of outcome order confirmed that the first outcome produced was 349 
ranked as more important on average than other outcomes (F(1,98) = 155.36, p < .001, eta2 = 350 
.61). There were no other significant main effects or interactions. Further, younger and older 351 
adults both ranked the first outcome they produced as the most important of all outcomes for 352 
45% of the activities. 353 
Association between envisioned possible outcomes of risky activities and self-reported risk-354 
taking 355 
The risk behavior, risk perceptions, and expected benefits subscales demonstrated 356 
adequate internal consistency (Table 1). Table 1 provides the mean group values for the sub-357 
scales and independent-samples t-tests comparing younger and older adults. Older adults re-358 
ported a significantly lower risk-taking likelihood than younger adults and perceived greater 359 
risks and expected fewer benefits of engaging in the activities. 360 
Table 2 provides the partial correlations between the factors generated for the activi-361 
ties and the risk-taking subscales, controlling for age (as a continuous variable). These in-362 
clude and the number of positive versus negative outcomes produced for activities as the first 363 
outcome (npositive outcomes – nnegative outcomes), the number of positive versus negative outcomes 364 
produced per activity (npositive outcomes – nnegative outcomes), and the mean importance ranking for 365 
positive versus negative outcomes (i.e., Mpositive outcomes – Mnegative outcomes). More frequently 366 
generating a positive versus a negative outcome as the first outcome and generating a greater 367 
number of positive versus negative outcomes overall were associated with higher risk-taking 368 
likelihood, lower risk perceptions, and greater expected benefits. A higher importance rank-369 
ing for positive versus negative outcomes was associated with higher risk-taking likelihood 370 
and greater expected benefits. Thus, the outcomes participants generated for the activities and 371 
their ratings of their importance were associated with their ratings of risk perception, ex-372 
pected benefits, risk-taking likelihood. 373 
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Multiple linear regression analyses were conducted to test for moderating effects of 374 
age on the association between the outcomes generated for activities and ratings on the risk-375 
taking subscales. Age moderated the association between importance rankings for positive vs. 376 
negative outcomes and risk-taking likelihood (β = .57, t = 2.87, p = .005), such that the asso-377 
ciation was stronger among younger (r(50) = -.63, p < .001) than older (r(50) = -.27, p = 378 
.058) age groups. Age also moderated the association between importance rankings for posi-379 
tive vs. negative outcomes and expected benefit ratings (β = .62, t = 2.89, p = .005), such that 380 
the association was stronger among younger (r(50) = -.62, p < .001) than older (r(50) = -.07, 381 
p = .651) age groups. There were no other significant moderating effects of age. Thus, the as-382 
sociation between the outcomes generated for activities and ratings on the risk-taking sub-383 
scales differed with age only for importance rankings. 384 
Summary 385 
In sum, younger and older adults did not differ in the overall number of positive and 386 
negative possible outcomes they generated for risky activities, but did differ in whether the 387 
first outcome they generated was positive or negative. Younger adults tended to first generate 388 
a positive outcome for activities whereas older adults tended to first generate a negative out-389 
come. Moreover, the first outcome generated tended to be rated as the most important in de-390 
termining whether they would engage in the activity. In Experiment 1, participants evaluated 391 
possible outcomes of engaging in real-life risky activities. The current findings reveal adult 392 
age-related differences in processing of valenced information that extend beyond processing 393 
of stimuli, such as faces and visual scenes (e.g., Mather & Carstensen, 2003), that have little 394 
association with real-life decision-making consequences. 395 
 396 
 397 
 398 
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Experiment 2 399 
In Experiment 1, younger and older adults did not differ in the overall number of 400 
positive and negative outcomes they generated when imagining engaging in real-life risky ac-401 
tivities. However, younger adults did exhibit an initial focus on positive outcomes, as they 402 
were more likely to generate a positive than a negative outcome as the first outcome they 403 
generated for activities, and this tendency shifted to an initial focus on negative outcomes in 404 
older age. A focus on positive over negative outcomes was also associated with individual 405 
differences in self-reported risk-taking. In Experiment 2, a reaction time task is used to inves-406 
tigate younger and older adults’ attentional processing of outcomes generated for the activi-407 
ties in Experiment 1. 408 
Method 409 
Participants 410 
Fifty younger adults (44% female; age range 18-32 years, M = 21.66, SD = 3.17) and 411 
49 older adults (55% female; age range 65-80 years, M = 69.22, SD = 3.42) were recruited 412 
from the university campus and local community. None of the participants who took part in 413 
Experiment 1 took part in Experiment 2. All older adults passed the mini mental state exami-414 
nation as a screen for cognitive impairment. Participants were compensated £5 (~$7.04 US 415 
dollars) for their participation, lasting around 30 minutes. Most younger adults were students 416 
(n = 40, 80%) and fewer were unemployed (n = 1, 2%) or full-time employed (n = 3, 6%). 417 
Most older adults were retired (n = 43, 88%), with the remaining in part-time employment (n 418 
= 6, 12%). 419 
Materials and procedure 420 
Outcome evaluation task. Participants were shown on a computer screen the risky 421 
activities used in Experiment 1 and for each activity were asked to decide as quickly as possi-422 
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ble whether outcomes that appeared on screen are relevant to each activity. In the upper por-423 
tion of the screen, participants were asked to imagine engaging in the activity that appeared in 424 
a box below. In the lower portion of the screen, they were asked whether the text that ap-425 
peared in the box below referred to something that might happen to them if they were to en-426 
gage in the activity above. The portions of the display were positioned to ensure the activity 427 
and outcome could be viewed simultaneously. Participants pressed either the ‘d’ (covered 428 
with a green label) or ‘k’ (covered with a red label) key on the computer keyboard to identify 429 
whether the outcome was something that could happen as a result of engaging in the activity. 430 
The participant instructions encouraged participants to respond as quickly and as accurately 431 
as possible.  432 
For each activity, participants were presented 15 outcomes. Five were positive out-433 
comes of the activity, five were negative outcomes of the activity, and five were irrelevant to 434 
the activity. All outcomes had been generated by participants in Experiment 1. A subset of 435 
the most frequently generated positive and negative outcomes for each activity were selected 436 
for use as stimuli. The positive outcomes selected for use in Experiment 2 had been generated 437 
by a mean of 15% of younger adults and a mean of 14% of older adults in Experiment 1. The 438 
negative outcomes selected for use in Experiment 2 had been generated by a mean of 13% of 439 
younger adults and a mean of 14% of older adults in Experiment 1. Independent-samples t-440 
tests confirmed there were no significant differences in the frequency that the positive (t(46) 441 
= 0.84, p = .403) and negative (t(46) = 0.71, p = .479) outcomes that had been generated by 442 
younger and older adults in Experiment 1. Therefore, the positive and negative outcomes se-443 
lected as stimuli equally reflected the outcomes generated by younger and older adults.  444 
Younger and older adults also exhibited a high level of agreement about the valence 445 
of the selected positive and negative outcomes. The positive outcomes had been rated as posi-446 
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tive by almost all younger and older participants who generated them in Experiment 1 (My-447 
ounger = 97%; Molder = 98%) and the negative outcomes had been rated as negative on almost 448 
every occasion they were generated (Myounger = 98%; Molder = 98%). Participants’ importance 449 
rankings were also assessed for the selected outcomes to ensure that they had been rated as 450 
equally important to decision-making by younger and older adults. An independent-samples 451 
t-test conducted on the mean rankings for each activity confirmed no significant differences 452 
between younger and older adults in their ranking of the importance of the positive (Myounger = 453 
3.39; Molder = 3.07; t(46) = 1.31, p = .197) and negative (Myounger = 3.98%; Molder = 3.94%; 454 
t(46) = 0.11, p = .914) outcomes. Therefore, the outcomes selected for use in Experiment 2 455 
did not differ between younger and older adults in their perceived importance for decision-456 
making. 457 
Participants were randomly assigned to each complete 16 of the 24 activities, re-458 
sponding to 15 outcomes for each activity. Sixteen activities was deemed appropriate for the 459 
targeted participation time (i.e., < 1 hour) and to minimize effects of fatigue. Activities were 460 
presented in a randomly generated order for each participant. Prior to beginning the first ac-461 
tivity, participants completed a practice activity with 15 outcomes to familiarize them with 462 
the task. 463 
Risk-taking attitudes. Participants completed the same 24-item risk-taking scale used 464 
in Experiment 1, assessing their self-reported risk behavior, risk perceptions, and expected 465 
benefits for each item in each of three sections of a printed booklet. 466 
Results 467 
In the outcome evaluation task, participants judged whether putative outcomes (posi-468 
tive, negative, irrelevant) generated by participants in Experiment 1 were relevant to activi-469 
ties. Traditionally, two-outcome response time tasks have been analyzed using analysis of 470 
variance (ANOVA) conducted separately on mean response time for correct responses and 471 
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the proportion of correct responses. However, this piecemeal approach fails to integrate re-472 
sponse time and accuracy, which can cause misleading results, especially for comparisons of 473 
younger and older adults. For example, Ratcliff, Thapar, and McKoon (2001) discovered that 474 
older adults’ slower response time on a discrimination task was due to the older adults adopt-475 
ing a more conservative response threshold, rather than an age-related slowing of information 476 
processing—as indicated by the group differences in mean response time. Here, a cognitive 477 
modeling approach is adopted, using diffusion model analysis, to decompose behavior on the 478 
task into psychologically meaningful parameters. Before presenting the modeling results, the 479 
traditional analysis is briefly described. 480 
Traditional analysis 481 
Overall, the percentage of correct responses on the outcome evaluation task was 482 
86% (SD = 8%). For many participants, accuracy was at least 90% (n = 41, 41%), and for 483 
most it was at least 75% (n = 93; 94%). A 2x2 mixed ANOVA was conducted on partici-484 
pants’ mean percentage of correct responses, including age (younger, older) and type of out-485 
come (positive, negative, irrelevant) as factors. A significant effect of type of outcome 486 
(F(2,194) = 76.35, p < .001, eta2 = .44) indicated that participants more often correctly identi-487 
fied irrelevant outcomes (M = 97%) than they correctly identified positive (M = 84%) or neg-488 
ative (M = 79%) outcomes. There was no significant effect of age (Myounger = 87%; Molder = 489 
87%; F(1,97) = 0.10, p = .753) and no interaction. 490 
The overall mean reaction time was 1.06sec (SD = 0.23sec). A 2x2 mixed ANOVA 491 
was conducted on participants’ mean reaction times to test for effects of age and type of out-492 
come. The analysis indicated that older adults (M = 1.29sec) were significantly slower to re-493 
spond than younger adults (M = 1.11sec; F(1,97) = 13.93, p < .001, eta2 = .13). However, the 494 
analysis also yielded a main effect of type of outcome (F(2,194) = 13.48, p < .001, eta2 = .12) 495 
and an interaction between age and type of outcome (F(2,194) = 15.67, p < .001, eta2 = .14). 496 
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Among younger adults, reaction time was fastest for positive outcomes (M = 1.06 sec), fol-497 
lowed by irrelevant (M = 1.12sec) and negative (M = 1.14sec) outcomes. Among older adults, 498 
reaction time was fastest for irrelevant outcomes (M = 1.19 sec), followed by positive (M = 499 
1.32sec) and negative (M = 1.35sec) outcomes. Thus, younger adults appeared to show a re-500 
action time advantage for positive outcomes, which was not apparent for the older adults. 501 
Diffusion model analysis 502 
Diffusion model analysis combines response time and accuracy and decomposes be-503 
havior into three psychologically meaningful parameters. Drift rate, v, measures the rate of 504 
evidence accumulation in favor of a response, where higher values indicate faster and more 505 
accurate responding. Boundary separation, a, measures an individual’s response criterion, 506 
where higher values indicate a more conservative criterion (i.e., stronger evidence is required 507 
before a decision is made), indicating cautious responding. A third parameter, nondecision 508 
time, Ter, represents the nondecision component of response time, which includes stimulus 509 
encoding and execution of a motor response. In the outcome evaluation task, nondecision 510 
time can be understood as involving processing of the stimulus outcome presented on screen 511 
for an activity before evaluating whether it is relevant to the activity. 512 
The EZ approach to diffusion model analysis, developed by Wagenmakers, van der 513 
Maas, & Grasman (2007), was adopted for the current data. The EZ approach accommodates 514 
small numbers of trials and high proportions of correct responses (Schmiedek, Oberauer, Wil-515 
helm, Süß, & Wittmann, 2007; Wagenmakers et al., 2007). The three EZ diffusion model pa-516 
rameters were estimated separately for positive, negative, and irrelevant outcomes for each 517 
participant.  518 
Drift rate (v) 519 
Younger and older adults were faster and more accurate (i.e., higher drift rate) to 520 
identify irrelevant outcomes than relevant outcomes of activities, but differed in their drift 521 
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rates according to the type of outcome (Figure 2). Inspecting Figure 2, younger adults exhib-522 
ited a higher mean drift rate than older adults specifically for positive outcomes. A 2x2 mixed 523 
ANOVA was conducted on participants’ drift rate values, including age (younger, old) and 524 
type of outcome (positive, negative, irrelevant) as factors. The analysis confirmed a signifi-525 
cant effect of type of outcome (F(2,194) = 138.64, p < .001, eta2 = .59). While there was no 526 
significant main effect of age (F(1,97) = 0.26, p = .612), age interacted with type of outcome 527 
(F(2,194) = 9.05, p < .001, eta2 = .09). Independent-samples t-tests confirmed significant age 528 
group differences in drift rate for positive (t(97) = 3.64, p < .001) and irrelevant (t(97) = 3.04, 529 
p = .003) outcomes, but not for negative outcomes (t(97) = 0.78, p = .437).   530 
Boundary separation (a) 531 
Older adults adopted a more conservative response criterion (i.e., higher boundary 532 
separation) than younger adults for all types of outcome (Figure 2). This finding replicates 533 
earlier findings of more cautious responding in older age (Ratcliff et al., 2001). A 2x2 mixed 534 
ANOVA, including age (younger, old) and type of outcome (positive, negative, irrelevant) as 535 
factors, confirmed a significant effect of age (F(1,97) = 9.53, p = .003, eta2 = .09). There was 536 
also a significant effect of type of outcome (F(2,194) = 94.12, p < .001, eta2 = .49), indicating 537 
a more conservative response threshold for irrelevant outcomes than for positive and negative 538 
outcomes (Figure 2). As such, participants required more evidence to reject an irrelevant out-539 
come than they required to accept a relevant outcome. There was no significant interaction.  540 
Nondecision time (Ter) 541 
Older adults exhibited a longer nondecision time than younger adults across the 542 
three types of outcomes (Figure 2), indicating that they took longer in general to encode the 543 
stimulus outcome and execute a response. A 2x2 mixed ANOVA, including age (younger, 544 
old) and type of outcome (positive, negative, irrelevant) as factors, confirmed a significant 545 
effect of age on nondecision time (F(1,97) = 12.27, p = .001, eta2 = .11). The analysis also 546 
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yielded a significant effect of type of outcome (F(2,194) = 8.46, p < .001, eta2 = .08) and an 547 
interaction between age and type of outcome (F(2,194) = 6.04, p = .003, eta2 = .06). Inde-548 
pendent-samples t-tests confirmed significant age group differences for positive (t(97) = 4.49, 549 
p < .001) and negative (t(97) = 3.07, p = .003) outcomes, but not for irrelevant outcomes 550 
(t(97) = 1.75, p = .084).  551 
Association between attentional focus on outcomes of risky activities and self-reported risk-552 
taking 553 
The three risk-attitude subscales exhibited reasonable levels of internal consistency 554 
(Table 1). Inspecting the mean group values for the subscales and the independent-samples t-555 
tests comparing younger and older adults, older adults reported significantly lower risk-taking 556 
likelihood, perceived greater risks, and expected fewer benefits for the activities.  557 
Table 2 provides the partial correlations between the three diffusion model parame-558 
ters and the risk-taking subscales, controlling for age (as a continuous variable). For each of 559 
the three parameters, values for negative outcomes were subtracted from the values for posi-560 
tive outcomes. A higher drift rate for positive versus negative outcomes was associated with 561 
higher risk-taking likelihood and lower perceived risk. A higher boundary separation for pos-562 
itive versus negative outcomes was associated with higher risk-taking likelihood and lower 563 
perceived risk. Finally, a longer nondecision time for positive versus negative outcomes was 564 
associated with lower risk-taking likelihood, higher perceived risk, and fewer expected bene-565 
fits. Thus, participants’ responding to possible outcomes of risky activities was associated 566 
with their ratings of risk perception, expected benefits, risk-taking likelihood. 567 
Multiple linear regression analyses were conducted to test for moderating effects of 568 
age on the association between the diffusion model parameter values and ratings on the risk-569 
taking subscales. Age moderated the association between nondecision time for positive vs. 570 
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negative outcomes and expected benefit ratings (β = .38, t = 2.12, p = .036), such that the as-571 
sociation was stronger among younger (r(50) = -.45, p = .001) than older (r(49) = -.03, p = 572 
.836) age groups. There were no other significant moderating effects of age. Thus, the associ-573 
ation between the diffusion model parameter values and ratings on the risk-taking subscales 574 
differed with age only for nondecision time. 575 
Summary 576 
In sum, younger adults were faster and more accurate than older adults to identify 577 
positive outcomes of risky activities, indicated by an age difference in drift rate, but did not 578 
differ in their responding to negative outcomes. Moreover, a higher drift rate for positive ver-579 
sus negative outcomes was associated with a higher self-reported likelihood of engaging in 580 
the activities and lower perceived risk. These novel findings reveal an opposing age-related 581 
tendency to the positivity effect reported in a large body of previous research (e.g., Murphy & 582 
Isaacowitz, 2008; Reed et al., 2014). Furthermore, individual differences in processing of 583 
positive and negative stimuli were associated with individual differences in risk perception 584 
and self-reported risk-taking, which indicates that age-related differences in processing of va-585 
lenced information also map onto perceptions and behavioral intentions that inform decision-586 
making.     587 
General Discussion 588 
Previous research has revealed an age-related positivity effect in cognitive pro-589 
cessing of positive and negative stimuli (Charles et al., 2003; Kenedy et al., 2004; Mather & 590 
Carstensen, 2003). Yet, these studies have focussed on stimuli, such as photos of faces and 591 
visual scenes, that have little association with real-life consequences. The current experi-592 
ments investigated whether the age-related positivity effect extends to valenced information 593 
that is associated with real-life consequences. In opposition to an age-related positivity effect, 594 
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the current experiments reveal novel age-related tendencies in the cognitive processing of va-595 
lenced information that map onto perceptions and behavioral intentions for real-life decision-596 
making scenarios. 597 
In Experiment 1, participants generated possible outcomes (e.g., ‘experience the cul-598 
ture’, ‘lose belongings’) of activities (e.g., ‘traveling to an unfamiliar country’). In stark con-599 
trast with the age-related positivity effect, younger adults showed an initial focus on retriev-600 
ing positive outcomes and this tendency shifted to an initial focus on negative outcomes in 601 
older age. In Experiment 2, younger adults were also faster to identify positive outcomes of 602 
activities than they were to identify negative outcomes—a tendency that dissipated in older 603 
age. The current evidence suggests that the age-related positivity effect does not extend to va-604 
lenced information, such as possible outcomes of engaging in risky activities, that is associ-605 
ated with real-life consequences. 606 
According to socioemotional selectivity theory (SST; Carstensen, 2006; Reed & 607 
Carstensen, 2012), people possess multiple goals that shift in priority across adulthood. The 608 
age-related positivity effect is important to the main tenets of SST as it is consistent with a 609 
notion that in later life priorities shift toward present-focussed goals that emphasize emo-610 
tional gratification, characterized by a preferential focus on positive stimuli over negative 611 
stimuli. Employing a novel methodology, the current experiments reveal an opposing prefer-612 
ence for processing positive stimuli over negative stimuli in younger age that reverses in 613 
older age. However, the current findings to not challenge the central tenets of SST. Rather, 614 
the findings extend SST and our understanding of adult developmental changes in goal orien-615 
tation by identifying an important case in which the positivity effect does not occur. As dis-616 
cussed in more detail later, the current findings suggest that older adults alter their priorities 617 
within their repertoire of goals, depending on the nature of their current task. This possibility, 618 
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which is not one of the tenets of SST, opens a new door to future enquiries that will lead to 619 
novel insights into adult age-related differences in goal orientation. 620 
The current findings also reveal new insights into how age-related differences in 621 
cognitive processing of valenced information influence behavior. A key proposition of SST is 622 
that an attentional focus on positive stimuli over negative stimuli promotes well-being in 623 
older age (Mather & Carstensen, 2003; Reed & Carstensen, 2012). There exists some support 624 
for this assertation. For example, Kennedy et al. (2004) found that older nuns, but not 625 
younger nuns, reported being in a more positive mood after answering questions about their 626 
personal memories. In the current investigation, whether participants focused their cognitive 627 
processing on positive outcomes or on negative outcomes of engaging in real-life risky activi-628 
ties was associated with their risk perceptions, expected benefits, and self-reported likelihood 629 
of engaging in the activities. This finding suggests that age-related differences in processing 630 
of valenced information associated with real-life consequences influences perceptions and be-631 
havioral intentions that inform decision-making. Together, these findings indicate that goal 632 
selection and prioritization across adulthood may be adaptive for enhancing well-being and 633 
decision-making. 634 
A handful of prior studies have found little (or no) evidence of the age-related posi-635 
tivity effect in memory recall (Depping & Freund, 2013; Grühn, Smith, & Baltes, 2005; 636 
Majerus & D’Argembeau, 2011). One proposed explanation is that methods used in these 637 
studies impose task-specific demands that impede or disrupt goal-orientation, typically by fo-638 
cussing attention on performance accuracy (Reed & Carstensen, 2012; Reed et al., 2014). For 639 
example, in the Grühn et al. (2005) study, participants were instructed to recall from a prior 640 
study list as many words as possible, which may have focussed participants on performance-641 
related goals. Here, younger and older adults did not differ in the total number of positive and 642 
negative outcomes they produced for activities. Relatedly, Beyth-Marom, Austin, Fischhoff, 643 
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Palmgren, and Jacobs-Quadrel (1993) investigated adolescents’ beliefs about the possible 644 
outcomes of engaging in risky activities. Adolescents typically exhibit higher levels of risk-645 
taking behavior than adults (Steinberg, 2008). Beyth-Marom et al. asked the adolescents to 646 
list possible positive and negative outcomes of risky activities (e.g., ‘your friends ask you to 647 
come along with them for a drive after a party where everyone has been drinking’). They also 648 
asked adults, some of whom were parents of the adolescents, to list possible outcomes they 649 
envisioned for an adolescent. Both age groups generated more negative than positive out-650 
comes, but surprisingly, adolescents and adults generated a similar number of positive and 651 
negative outcomes. Seemingly, risk-taking tendencies during adolescence do not appear to 652 
result from a failure to consider negative possible outcomes of actions nor from a focus on 653 
positive possible outcomes. As such, adolescents and adults appear to possess similar beliefs 654 
or knowledge about the possible outcomes of engaging in risky activities. 655 
However, here, age differences did occur with regard to participants’ initial focus on 656 
positive and negative outcomes. Crucially, participants who generated more positive (than 657 
negative) outcomes as their first outcome for activities independently reported a higher likeli-658 
hood that they would engage in the activities and perceived fewer risks and expected greater 659 
benefits of engagement. In Experiment 2, faster responding to positive (versus negative) out-660 
comes—as indicated by drift rate—was associated with a higher reported likelihood of en-661 
gaging in the activities and lower risk perceptions. Thus, the first outcome participants gener-662 
ated in Experiment 1 and their evaluations of outcomes in Experiment 2 were associated with 663 
their attitudes toward risk-taking in terms of their self-reported likelihood to take a risk, their 664 
risk perceptions, and expected benefits. Therefore, it is unlikely that the methods employed in 665 
the current experiments imposed tasks-specific demands that focussed participants on task-666 
related goals in a way that has been observed in other studies (e.g., Grühn et al., 2005). Any 667 
such disruption to goal-orientation and focus on task-related goals should have eliminated the 668 
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association between the types of outcomes participants generated (Experiment 1) and their 669 
evaluations of outcomes (Experiment 2) and their attitudes toward risk-taking. 670 
Why did younger and older adults differ in the first outcome they generated for ac-671 
tivities, but did not differ in the overall numbers of positive and negative outcomes they gen-672 
erated? One possibility is that tasks that require participants to list outcomes of activities as-673 
sess knowledge of the possible outcomes rather than tendencies to consider positive and neg-674 
ative outcomes when deciding whether to engage in an activity. From a young age, individu-675 
als likely become aware of the typical outcomes associated with many risky activities, such 676 
as engaging in unprotected sex or driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Age differ-677 
ences in risk-taking may depend not on the extent of an individual’s knowledge of the possi-678 
ble outcomes of an activity, but on tendencies to retrieve possible outcomes from memory 679 
during decision-making. Indeed, memory retrieval is an essential component of various kinds 680 
of decision-making and the same brain regions that are involved in memory retrieval are also 681 
involved in decision-making (Euston, Gruber, & McNaughton, 2012). The willingness to take 682 
a risk may result from a tendency to retrieve from memory positive rather than negative pos-683 
sible outcomes of engaging in an activity. Hence, younger and older adults in Experiment 1, 684 
and adolescents and adults in the Grühn et al. study (2005), may not have differed in the 685 
overall numbers of positive and negative outcomes they generated as this measure partially 686 
reflects their knowledge of all possible outcomes, which may differ little with age. Inspecting 687 
the first outcome participants generate for an activity may provide a better assessment of age 688 
differences in the types of outcomes that people automatically retrieve from memory when 689 
deciding whether to engage in an activity. 690 
The current findings indicate that the age-related positivity effect may not extend to 691 
valenced information that is associated with real-life possible consequences. While the age-692 
related positivity effect is robust, supported by two meta-analyses (Murphy & Isaacowitz, 693 
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2008; Reed et al., 2014), other findings in the literature also suggest that under specific cir-694 
cumstances the positivity effect does not occur. In one study, participants inspected positive 695 
and negative features of vacation options (Depping & Freund, 2013). When told that they 696 
would later assess the options for their readability, older adults showed the typical positivity 697 
effect in their memory recall of the features. Conversely, when told that they would later 698 
make decisions about the travel options, older adults no longer showed the positivity effect in 699 
their memory recall. Together, these findings suggest that older adults may adopt a goal-700 
driven focus on emotionally gratifying stimuli, but adopt alternative goals either when va-701 
lenced information is associated with real-life possible outcomes or can inform later deci-702 
sions. A fruitful direction for future research would be to further explore the cognitive mech-703 
anisms involved in older adults’ switching between goals in their processing of valenced in-704 
formation. This line of enquiry would further enrich our understanding of how adult develop-705 
mental changes in goal orientation influence cognitive processing of positive and negative in-706 
formation. 707 
A range of risky activities were designed for the present purposes, capturing a broad 708 
spectrum of real-life activities in four domains of life. Recent research has revealed that adult 709 
age-related differences in self-reported risk-taking differ across life domains (e.g., recrea-710 
tional, financial, social, health; Rolison et al., 2014; in press). Namely, risk-taking behavior 711 
decreases more sharply with age in some domains (e.g., recreational) than in others (e.g., so-712 
cial). The current experiments did not permit an examination of possible domain differences 713 
in the types of outcomes younger and older adults generate for activities and their evaluations 714 
of outcomes. This was due to a focus on a broad range of real-life activities at the expense of 715 
an adequate number of items within each domain. Future research could explore the possibil-716 
ity of domain differences by using a larger set of items within each domain, such as by focus-717 
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sing on a smaller number of domains. In the current experiments, the first outcome partici-718 
pants generated and their evaluations of outcomes were associated with their self-reported 719 
risk-taking, risk perceptions, and expected benefits. Thus, domain differences in risk-taking 720 
are likely to map onto domain differences in the types of outcomes that people generate and 721 
their evaluations of those outcomes. 722 
In conclusion, the current investigation reveals that despite the robust nature of the 723 
age-related positivity effect it may not extend to cognitive processing of valenced information 724 
that is associated with real-life consequences. Older adults may exhibit present-focused goals 725 
and prioritize emotional gratification, as proposed by socioemotional selectivity theory (Car-726 
stensen, 2006; Charles & Carstensen, 2010), but also appear to switch to alternative goals, de-727 
pending on the nature of their task. 728 
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Table 1. Mean group risk-taking likelihood, risk perceptions, and expected benefits of younger and older 
adults. 
  Younger adults Older adults  
 Cronbach 
α 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
M 
 
SD 
Independent-
samples t-value 
Experiment 1       
Risk behavior .84 0.40 0.89 -0.36 0.68 4.82*** 
Risk perceptions .83 2.97 0.68 3.51 0.65 4.11*** 
Expected benefits .83 3.04 0.69 2.52 0.64 3.90*** 
       
Experiment 2       
Risk behavior .80 0.17 0.75 -0.43 0.73 4.04*** 
Risk perceptions .84 3.09 0.63 3.50 0.76 2.92** 
Expected benefits .83 3.16 0.59 2.41 0.68 5.86*** 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 867 
 868 
 869 
 870 
 871 
 872 
 873 
 874 
 875 
 876 
 877 
 878 
 879 
 880 
 881 
 882 
 883 
 884 
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Table 2. Correlations involving risk-taking likelihood, risk perceptions, and ex-
pected benefits. 
 Risk  
behavior 
Risk  
perceptions 
Expected 
benefits 
Experiment 1    
First outcome
 (positive – negative) .39*** -.29** .26** 
Importance ranking (positive – negative) -.46*** .19 -.34*** 
Number of outcomes (positive – negative) .38*** -.28** .24* 
    
Experiment 2    
Drift rate (v) (positive – negative) .38*** -.32** .18 
Boundary separation (a) (positive – negative) .25* -.25* .12 
Nondecision time (Ter) (positive – negative) -.44*** .32*** -.23* 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 885 
 886 
 887 
 888 
 889 
 890 
 891 
 892 
 893 
 894 
 895 
 896 
 897 
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 898 
Figure 1. Estimated probabilities of first generating a positive or negative outcome for activi-899 
ties among younger and older adults. The vertical bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals 900 
around the estimated probability. 901 
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904 
 905 
Figure 2. Mean group drift rate (v), boundary separation (a), and nondecision time (Ter) val-906 
ues for positive, negative, and irrelevant outcomes among younger and older adults. The ver-907 
tical bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals around the estimated probability. 908 
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Appendix A: Risky activity items 915 
Table A1 provides the 24 items used to assess risk-taking attitudes and for which 916 
participants generated outcomes in Experiment 1 and evaluated outcomes in Experiment 2. 917 
Items 1, 5, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 16, 17, and 24 were adapted from the DOSPERT scale, developed 918 
by Blais and Weber (2006). 919 
Table A1: Risk-taking attitudes scale items  
Life Domain Questionnaire Item 
Recreational 1. Going camping in the wilderness 
 2. Taking a ride through the countryside on the back of a high performance motorcycle  
 3. Going winter swimming in an icy lake as part of a sporting event 
 4. Traveling alone in an unfamiliar country  
 5. Taking a river rapid ride on a small boat 
 6. Petting a lion in a nature reserve as part of a demonstration to tourists 
  
Social 7. Admitting your tastes are different from those of a friend 
 8. Disagreeing with an authority figure or person of influence on a major issue 
 9. Moving to a city far away from your close friends and family 
 10. Speaking at a debate club in your local community 
 11. Speaking your views on a controversial issue with people who are unfamiliar with you 
 12. Joining a social club at the local community centre to make new friends 
  
Financial 13. Betting on the outcome of a sporting event 
 14. Investing in a speculative but potentially lucrative stock on the stock market 
 15. Using your credit card to pay for an item on an unfamiliar website 
 16. Investing a small amount of your income or savings in a potentially highly lucrative 
new start-up firm 
 17. Betting a day's income or savings at the horse races 
 18. Investing some of your savings in the stock market on the recommendation of your fi-
nancial advisor 
  
Health 19. Starting a new intense exercise routine 
 20. Using a sun bed in a tanning studio to top up your vitamin D levels 
 21. Taking a ride home in a taxi that doesn't have seatbelts 
 22. Joining a weekly high energy exercise class at your local gym 
 23. Taking an unfamiliar medication while on holiday abroad 
 24. Drinking heavily on a weeknight 
 920 
 
